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Note
THE COCA-COLA CAPITATION CONUNDRUM: THE SUPREME
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA LEAVES PHILADELPHIANS
THIRSTY FOR SODA AND CERTAINTY IN
WILLIAMS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
JOHN T. MORGAN, JR.*
“[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy . . . .”1
I. BREAKING THE ICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PREEMPTION
OF LOCAL TAXES IN PENNSYLVANIA
Over two centuries after prominent Philadelphia resident, Benjamin
Franklin, equated the certainty of taxes to that of death, Philadelphians
pay some of the highest taxes in America.2  Residents of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania pay almost four percent of their annual income to the city, in
addition to state and federal income tax.3  Those choosing to forego the
city life and commute to work fare only slightly better, as they are sub-
jected to a three-and-a-half-percent city income tax.4  Philadelphia taxes
result in the inflation of ticket prices for Eagles, Phillies, and Flyers games,
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S.Ed. 2016, Emporia State University.  This Note is dedicated to my fiance´e and
law school sweetheart, Brittany Saxton, who I’m sure is quite thrilled to be
acknowledged in an article about municipal taxing authority, and who so patiently
tolerated many long hours apart so I could research, write, and edit.  I also want to
thank Lydia Ellsworth, Tanner McCarron, Peyton Carper, Timothy Muyano,
Thallia Malespin, Ryan Ahrens, Meaghan Geatens, and Abigail Glascott for their
meticulous and attentive feedback which made this Note possible.
1. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) (opinion of Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall) (“[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy . . . .”).
2. See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Leroy (Nov. 13, 1789),
in THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1789–1790, 68–69 (Albert Henry Smith,
ed., 1907) (“Our new Constitution is now established, and has an appearance that
promises permanency; but in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except
death and taxes.”); Cities with the Highest Tax Rates, INTUIT TURBO TAX (2016),
https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tips/fun-facts/cities-with-the-highest-tax-rates/L2
WEdS802 [https://perma.cc/4LFB-HC3D] (ranking Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
second in the United States for highest municipal taxes).
3. See PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 19-1500, § 19-1502 (2018) (imposing tax of
2.3809% on income of Philadelphia residents as of July 1, 2018); PHILA., PA., CODE
ch. 19-2800, § 19-2803(2018) (imposing additional tax of 1.5% on income of Phila-
delphia residents).
4. See PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 19-1500, § 1502 (2018) (imposing tax of 3.4567%
on nonresidents of Philadelphia as of July 1, 2018).
(137)
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along with many similar “amusements.”5  In fact, Philadelphians cannot
stay in a hotel, purchase a dog, park a car, or play a game of ski-ball with-
out being subjected to a city tax.6  Philadelphia residents pay roughly forty-
five different types of taxes despite legislation designed to limit the taxing
authority of Pennsylvania cities, boroughs, and municipalities.7
Although cities like Philadelphia appear to possess immense taxing
authority, it may come as a surprise that, independently, local govern-
ments are effectively powerless in their ability to levy taxes.8  In fact, town-
ships, cities, and municipalities rely exclusively on delegations from state
legislatures to police their citizens, organize their communities, and—im-
portantly—raise revenue through taxation.9  While the extent of a local
government’s authority varies dramatically from state to state, one princi-
ple remains ubiquitous: local ordinances must not be inconsistent with
state law.10  Parties seeking to evade enforcement of municipal legislation
5. See PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 19-600, § 19-603 (1937) (imposing tax on admis-
sion fees for concerts, movies, and sporting events).  Other amusements subject to
the tax include:
Any theatrical or operatic performance, concerts, motion picture shows,
vaudeville, circuses, carnivals, side shows, exhibitions, shows, displays,
dancing, all forms of entertainment at fair grounds, amusement parks
and athletic contests, including wrestling matches, boxing and sparring
exhibitions, baseball, football and basketball games, golfing, tennis,
hockey, archery and shooting, where a charge, donation, contribution or
monetary charge of any character is made for admission.
Id. § 19-601.
6. See PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 19-2400, § 19-2402 (1986) (imposing tax on price
to stay in hotel rooms in Philadelphia); PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 10-100, § 10-103
(1986) (imposing licensing fee of forty dollars per unsterilized dog and sixteen
dollars per sterilized dog); PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 19-1200 (1937) (imposing tax on
parking or storing vehicles in city); PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 19-900, § 19-1903 (1945)
(imposing tax of one hundred dollars per year per “mechanical amusement
device”).
7. See Gene Marks, 44 Taxes We Pay as Residents of the Great City of Philadelphia,
PHILA. MAG. (Mar. 6, 2015, 10:38 AM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2015/
03/06/43-taxes-pay-residents-great-city-philadelphia/ [https://perma.cc/T7FH-U
P5L] (listing various taxes for which Philadelphia residents are liable to pay).
Other taxes imposed by Philadelphia include the Vehicle Rental Tax, the Excise
Tax on Outdoor Advertising Transactions, and the Tobacco and Tobacco-Related
Products Tax. See generally PHILA., PA., CODE tit. 19 (governing finance, taxes, and
collections).
8. See, e.g., 1Pt1 MATTHEWS MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 1A:2 (2d ed. 2018) (not-
ing that a municipality’s inherent lack of power is “practically a universal rule in all
50 states”).
9. See, e.g., United Tavern Owners v. Sch. Dist. of Phila, 272 A.2d 868, 870 (Pa.
1970) (plurality opinion) (restating that local governments have no authority apart
from that which is granted by a state legislature).
10. See, e.g., 1Pt1 MATTHEWS MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 2:3 (2d ed. 2018)
(“[I]n case of conflict between an ordinance and a state law, the latter prevails.”); 5
MCQUILLIN: THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 15:18 (3d ed. 2018) (“It is
fundamental that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to
the laws of the state.”).
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routinely invoke this principle to argue that state law preempts the local
ordinance.11
In Pennsylvania, the Sterling Act and the Local Tax Enabling Act pri-
marily govern the power of local municipalities to levy taxes.12  Appropri-
ately known as the “Tax Anything Act,” these laws empower municipalities
with the authority to impose taxes on anything the Commonwealth does
not already tax.13  Thus, a local tax is preempted if it is merely a duplicate
of an existing Commonwealth tax.14  In the more than seven decades
since its inception, the Sterling Act has been the focal point of numerous
legal challenges to Philadelphia’s authority to levy taxes.15  Unfortunately,
the existing body of case law interpreting municipal taxation power under
the Sterling Act lacks the cohesion necessary for predictable and consis-
tent boundaries on local tax power.16
11. See, e.g., 24 FLA. PRAC., FLORIDA MUNICIPAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:10
(2018) (“A Florida municipality may not make any law on a matter preempted to
the state or county government by the Florida Constitution, by general law, or
pursuant to a county charter.”). See generally 16 MCQUILLIN: THE LAW OF MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATIONS § 44:222 (3d ed. 2018) (listing pursuit of injunction as a rem-
edy against taxes forbidden by law).
12. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 15971–15976 (West 2018) (codi-
fying the Sterling Act).  The Sterling Act applies only to “cities of the first class,”
which is a municipality with a population of at least one million residents. See 53
PA. STAT AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (West 2018) (defining different classes of
cities); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 15971–15976 (West 2018).  Philadel-
phia is the only city in Pennsylvania qualifying as a city of the first class. See 53 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6924.101–6924.901 (West 2018) (codifying the Lo-
cal Tax Enabling Act).  The Local Tax Enabling Act applies virtually everywhere in
Pennsylvania besides Philadelphia, to:
[C]ities of the second class, cities of the second class A, cities of the third
class, boroughs, towns, townships of the first class, townships of the sec-
ond class, school districts of the second class, school districts of the third
class, and school districts of the fourth class, in all cases including inde-
pendent school districts. . . .
See id.
13. See, e.g., Coe v. Duffield, 138 A.2d 303, 305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (refer-
ring to the Sterling Act as the “Tax Anything Act”); Kenneth H. Ryesky, Devil’s
Dictionary of Taxation, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 54, 73 (2005) (citing 53 P.S.
§ 15971) (defining Pennsylvania’s Sterling Act as the “Tax Anything Act”); In re
N.E. Sch. Dist. Res No. 979-1974, 1974 WL 15788, at *1 (Erie Cty. Ct. Common
Pleas August 30, 1974) (referring to the Local Tax Enabling Act as the “Tax Any-
thing Act”) (internal citation omitted).
14. See 27 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D TAXATION § 14:5 (2d ed. 2018) (explaining Penn-
sylvania’s tax preemption doctrine).
15. See James A. Moore, The “Home Rule” Tax Act—A Solution or a Challenge?, 97
U. PA. L. REV. 811, 820 (1948) (referring to Act as a “super litigation-breeder”). See
generally The Sterling Act: A Brief History, PHILA. ECON. LEAGUE (Mar. 1999) (summa-
rizing history of challenges to Philadelphia’s taxing authority since passage of Ster-
ling Act).
16. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Tax Rev. Bd., 601 A.2d 875, 877 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992) (“[I]t is difficult to extract a comprehensive analysis to be used
whenever preemption of local taxation is claimed.”), appeal denied sub nom. Janney
Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 612 A.2d 986 (Pa. 1992).  For a
3
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In 2018, in Williams v. Philadelphia,17 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania applied the preemption doctrine to a city-imposed tax on sugary
beverages—better known as a “soda tax”.18  Despite conflicting authority
concerning the level of deference granted to city legislatures and the legal
standard for evaluating a local tax’s alleged state tax duplication, the court
upheld the city’s authority to implement the soda tax under the Sterling
Act.19  In fact, the Williams court unwaveringly upheld the dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ complaint before the City of Philadelphia even responded to the
allegations therein.20  However, even after Williams, the precise scope of
municipal taxing authority in Pennsylvania remains unclear, and any at-
tempt to definitively clarify the bounds of this authority will likely require
legislative action.21
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in
Williams and observes that this decision fails to reconcile decades of disa-
greement regarding the application of the Sterling Act’s preemption doc-
trine.22  This Note further advocates for a legislative cure for the
uncertainty affecting this frequently litigated area of law.23  Part II exam-
ines the historical development of the preemption doctrine in Penn-
sylvania and in the United States.24  Part III outlines the procedural
history and facts of Williams.25  Part IV summarizes the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s rationale for upholding Philadelphia’s sugary beverage
discussion of conflicting decisions interpreting the Sterling Act, see infra notes
74–101 and accompanying text.
17. 188 A.3d 421 (Pa. 2018).
18. See id. at 424 (announcing subject of appeal).
19. See id. at 433 n.14 (acknowledging the heavily conflicted and contradic-
tory body of law comprising local tax preemption doctrine).  For a discussion of
the inconsistencies inherent in Pennsylvania tax preemption doctrine, see infra
notes 74–101 and accompanying text.
20. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 427 n.4 (stating procedural posture of litigation).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s grant of the City’s pre-
liminary objections in the form of a demurrer. See id. (noting that the trial court
sustained preliminary objections in favor of the City).  If a party files preliminary
objections to a complaint, it does not have to file an answer unless the court over-
rules its preliminary objections. See PA. R. CIV. P. NO. 1028(d) (2016) (allowing
objecting party time to answer complaint if court denies preliminary objections).
21. See id. at 435–37 (acknowledging conflicting interpretation of Sterling Act
in precedent, but refusing to reconcile disharmony, believing that legislative action
is more appropriate).
22. For an overview of the inconsistencies inherent in Pennsylvania’s local tax
preemption doctrine, see infra notes 74–101 and accompanying text.  For a com-
plete critical analysis of the Williams decision’s pragmatic shortfalls, see infra notes
139–90 and accompanying text.
23. For a complete argument in favor of a legislative solution to uncertainty in
the doctrine of state preemption of local taxes, see infra notes 179–90 and accom-
panying text.
24. For an outline of the history, development, and significance of state pre-
emption of local taxes, see infra notes 29–101 and accompanying text.
25. For an explanation of the facts leading up to the Williams decision, see
infra notes 103–13 and accompanying text.
4
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tax.26  Part V analyzes the Williams court’s interpretation of the Sterling
Act and advocates for legislative clarification.27  Finally, Part VI discusses
the potential implications on the actions of businesses, industries, and mu-
nicipalities in light of the questions regarding the scope of local tax au-
thority that Williams left unanswered.28
II. SHARING A COKE AND CONTROL: THE HISTORY OF
LOCAL DELEGATION AND PREEMPTION
In the American multi-tiered system of government, laws frequently
overlap and conflict.29  At any given moment, a person in the United
States is simultaneously subject to federal, state, county, and municipal ju-
risdiction, as each tier of government may enact its own policies and levy
its own taxes.30  Generally, where two governments’ laws conflict (for ex-
ample, federal and municipal), the doctrine of preemption provides that
the supreme law will govern.31
A. Who’s Got “the Juice?” An Overview of Preemption
and Local Government Power
In the historic struggle between federal and state power, McCulloch v.
Maryland32 unequivocally established that where a state law interferes with
a federal law the latter must prevail over the former.33  In McCulloch, Mary-
26. For a summary of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Wil-
liams decision as it relates to state preemption of local taxing authority, see infra
notes 114–38 and accompanying text.
27. For a critical analysis of Williams, see infra notes 139–90 and accompany-
ing text.
28. For a discussion of the Williams decision’s significance and impact, see
infra notes 191–96 and accompanying text.
29. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
1971) (“The world is composed of territorial states having separate and differing
systems of law.  Events and transactions occur, and issues arise, that may have a
significant relationship to more than one state, making necessary a special body of
rules and methods for their ordering and resolution.”).
30. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (West 2018) (imposing federal income tax on every
individual); 72 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7202 (West 2017) (imposing state
tax on retail sales of personal property or services); ALLEGHENY CTY., PA., CODE
§ 475-12 (2017) (imposing county sales tax); PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 19-1500, § 1502
(2018) (imposing city tax on salaries, wages, commissions, and other
compensation).
31. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (“Municipalities shall have authority
to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within
their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in
conflict with general laws.” (emphasis added)); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“A municipal-
ity which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function
not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any
time.” (emphasis added)); cf. preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“The principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can super-
sede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation.”).
32. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
33. See id. at 405–06 (noting supremacy of federal law over state law).
5
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land’s objections to the Second Bank of the United States manifested in
the state levying a special tax exclusively targeting national bank transac-
tions.34  Although the Tenth Amendment granted residual powers to the
states, Justice Marshall ultimately relied on the Supremacy Clause in up-
holding the national bank and invalidating the Maryland tax.35  Today,
almost 200 years after McCulloch, the Supremacy Clause remains the bed-
rock for federal preemption doctrine.36
Apart from the federalism context, preemption can also refer to the
nullification of a local law because it interferes with state law.37  Much like
a state law’s inferiority to its federal counterpart, municipal laws are like-
wise subject to state supremacy.38  Cities, municipalities, and other local
governments have no inherent power to create or enforce laws.39  Rather,
local governments derive their power to enact legislation, including taxing
policies, from the state government.40  The precise manifestation of this
authority varies from state to state.41  However, most states choose to dele-
34. See id. at 317–18 (describing Maryland tax on national bank).
35. See id. at 405–06 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2) (invalidating Maryland
tax because United States law is “supreme law of the land” under Constitution).
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”); U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  The Supremacy Clause
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
36. See, e.g., JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
5 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2006) (calling McCulloch a “major historic milepost on the road
to today’s federal preemption . . . .”).
37. See Nicole DuPuis et al., City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State
Analysis, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES 3 (2018), https://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/
2017-03/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5TZD-P3JE] (defining concept of preemption at the local-state level).
38. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. et al., Is the Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the
Influence of Dillon’s Rule on Growth Management, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 3 (Jan.
2003) (analogizing Tenth Amendment and federal preemption with state preemp-
tion of local law).
39. See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (“In the
absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities
have no inherent right of self-government which is beyond the legislative control
of the state.”); United Tavern Owners v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 272 A.2d 868, 870 (Pa.
1971) (observing that Pennsylvania cities have no inherent authority absent state
delegation); see also 1 JOHN FORREST DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNIC-
IPAL CORPORATIONS § 89 (5th ed. 1911) (stating that municipalities, as creations of
states, have no inherent right of self-government).
40. See, e.g., 1Pt1 MATTHEWS MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 1A:1 (2d ed. 2018) (ex-
plaining that municipalities draw all authority through constitution or legislation
of states).
41. Compare IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A (“Municipal corporations . . . shall not
have the power to levy any tax unless expressly authorized by the general assem-
6
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gate local autonomy powers—or “home rule” powers—to its cities and mu-
nicipalities.42  The bundle of home rule powers the state grants to local
governments generally includes varying degrees of structural, functional,
fiscal, and personnel powers.43  Typical delegations of home rule authority
include law enforcement, sanitation, and safety powers, as well as authority
reasonably necessary and expedient to exercise these powers.44
After a state delegates legislative authority to its municipalities,
residual issues may arise regarding the precise scope of that authority as
applied to specific initiatives.45  When a municipality’s authority is chal-
bly.”), with MASS. CONST. amend. art. 2, § 1 (granting “the right of self-government
in local matters”), and OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(5) (granting powers to municipali-
ties to adopt legislation); see also Richardson, supra note 38, at 17–28 (providing
fifty state survey of local authority delegation); Preemption Watch, GRASSROOTS
CHANGE, https://grassrootschange.net/preemption-watch/ [https://perma.cc/2
HPC-QGYK] (providing fifty state survey of state preemption of local authority on
selected issues) (last visited Nov. 18, 2018); City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A
State-by-State Analysis, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nlc.org/
resource/city-rights-in-an-era-of-preemption-a-state-by-state-analysis [https://per
ma.cc/DJJ5-S8WS] (providing fifty state visual aid showing areas of preemption by
state).
42. See CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (bestowing home rule powers to cities and
counties); COLO. CONST. art. 20, § 6 (delegating home rule to cities and towns);
IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2 (delegating local police and sanitary authority to cities,
counties, and towns); ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6 (permitting municipalities to “perform
any function pertaining to its government and affairs. . .”); IOWA CONST. art. 3,
§ 38A (granting home rule authority to municipal corporations); LA. CONST. art. 6,
§ 5 (establishing home rule for local governmental subdivisions); PA. CONST. art. 9,
§ 2 (providing for municipal home rule powers).  The term “home rule” means “a
state legislative provision or action allocating a measure of autonomy to a local
government conditional on its acceptance of certain terms.” Home rule, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
43. See Cities 101—Delegation of Power, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://www.nlc.org/resource/cities-101-delegation-of-power [https://perma.cc/
RY8F-HTQ2] (listing categories of powers delegated to cities).  Each subset of au-
thority is defined as follows:
Structural—power to choose the form of government, charter and enact
charter revisions
Functional—power to exercise local self-government in a broad or lim-
ited manner
Fiscal—authority to determine revenue sources, set tax rates, borrow
funds and other related financial activities
Personnel—authority to set up employment rules, renumeration rates,
employment conditions and collective bargaining
Id.
44. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2 (delegating local police and sanitary
authority to cities); ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(a) (allowing home rule units to “exercise
any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs in-
cluding, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public
health, safety, morals and welfare. . .”); KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5(b) (empowering
cities to determine local affairs, determine local government, and levy taxes).
45. See Richardson, supra note 38, at 3–4 (observing that courts may be re-
quired to interpret precise scope of local authority granted by state legislatures).
In most cases, the standard of review may be found in the state’s constitution or
within the statute granting the subject authority; however, in the absence of consti-
7
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lenged in court, judges must generally determine whether to construe the
statutory or constitutional authority at issue restrictively or liberally.46
Under the restrictive approach, local government power is limited to that
which the state legislature has expressly authorized.47  This approach is
better known as “Dillon’s Rule” and restricts the powers of local govern-
ments to those: (1) expressly granted, (2) necessarily or fairly incident to
those express powers, and (3) essential and indispensable—not merely
convenient.48  Moreover, any ambiguity related to local power is construed
against the city.49  Even in some home rule states, courts will apply Dillon’s
Rule and construe statutory delegations against the municipality.50  Sev-
eral jurisdictions oppose Dillon’s Rule and expressly prohibit this ap-
proach when interpreting the extent of a city’s home rule authorities.51
tutional or legislative guidance, the court sets its own standard of review. See id. at
4–5 (diagraming state and local relationship as it relates to determination of stan-
dard of review).
46. See id. at 6 (noting two main cannons of interpretation).
47. See, e.g., Caesar v. State, 610 P.2d 517, 519 (Idaho 1980) (applying Dillon’s
rule).  The name “Dillon Rule” traces its origins to Judge John F. Dillon’s treatise
on municipal corporations. See 1 JOHN FORREST DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 98 (5th ed. 1911) (describing limitations on
local government powers).  With respect to the powers of localities to govern, Dil-
lon writes:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corpo-
ration possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others:
first, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essen-
tial to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reason-
able, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by
the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.
Id.  Home rule and Dillon’s Rule are often incorrectly characterized as dichoto-
mous in nature. See Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need
Home Rule? 84 N.C. L. REV. 1983, 2011–12 (Sep. 2006) (distinguishing between
Dillon rule and home rule).  The distinction is described by one critic as follows:
Home rule describes the source and extent of delegation by the state,
whereas Dillon’s rule is a rule of judicial interpretation that may be used
regardless of the form of delegated authority, unless the legislature has
expressed an intention for a more liberal standard.
Id.
48. See 1 JOHN FORREST DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 98 (5th ed. 1911) (listing powers possessed by local
governments).
49. See id. (describing rules of construction for statutes granting authority to
local governments).
50. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis Hous. Auth. v. Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d 460, 462
(Mo. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted) (construing home rule statute against
grant of power).
51. See IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 38A (abrogating Dillon’s Rule); N.M. CONST. art.
10, § 6(E) (requiring construction of municipal authority so as “to provide for
maximum local self-government.”; IND. CODE. ANN. § 36-1-3-4 (West 2018) (abro-
gating Dillon’s Rule); N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 160A-4 (West 2018) (requiring broad
construction of powers granted to municipalities and all supplementary powers
8
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Although the power to tax certainly seems to accompany the power to
self-govern, taxation is not traditionally recognized as a power delegated to
municipalities through home rule provisions.52  To the contrary, restraint
over municipal fiscal power is quite common among the several states.53
Most limits on taxing authority arose during the 1970s as voters objected
to high taxes and a dangerously inflating dollar.54  As a result, even states
granting broad bestowments of home rule power nonetheless exclude the
power to levy taxes and borrow money in the interest of curtailing the
abuse of this power.55  Kentucky’s constitution, for example, permits the
legislature to allow cities to perform “any function” that furthers a govern-
mental purpose, yet also places restrictions on the taxes these cities may
levy.56  Forty-two states, including Kentucky, limit taxation or expenditure
powers of municipalities in some way.57
necessary or expedient for their execution); S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-10 (2018) (re-
quiring liberal construction of home rule powers in favor of municipality).
52. See 1 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 2:10 (3d ed. 2018) (stating that taxing
authority is not required when forming a municipality).
53. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 12, § 4 (limiting municipal taxes levied on prop-
erty); IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 38A (abrogating Dillon’s Rule with respect to every
home rule power except the power to levy taxes); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 41305(1)(viii) (West 2018) (excluding power to limit rates and fix subjects
of taxation from powers granted to cities of the third class); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 41305(1)(viii) (West 2018) (excluding “fixing subjects of taxation”
from powers granted under home rule charter to municipalities); see also George
D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in
Home Rule, 24 STETSON L. REV. 417, 461–66 (1995) (noting that fiscal powers of
municipalities are most frequently and significantly curtailed). But see ILL. CONST.
art. 7, § 6 (allowing local taxes except those imposed on income, earnings, or oc-
cupations); KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5 (enumerating taxation as a power granted to
cities); MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 21 (granting cities and villages power to levy “taxes
for public purposes”); UTAH CONST. art. 11, § 5(a) (listing power to levy, assess,
and collect taxes among powers conferred upon cities by home rule amendment).
Ironically, the concept of taxation as it is known today originally developed in an-
cient cities. See 16 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 44:3 (3d ed. 2018) (noting that taxa-
tion as a means for generating government revenue developed in ancient cities
and towns).
54. See DuPuis, supra note 37, at 23 (explaining origins of state limits on local
taxation and expenditure authority).
55. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 6 (restricting cities’ taxation powers “so
as to prevent the abuse of such power”).
56. Compare KY. CONST. § 156b (authorizing state legislature to grant broad
home rule powers to cities), with KY. CONST. § 157 (capping tax rates that may be
imposed by cities).  This exclusion of taxation from home rule powers is likely due
to a key distinction between police and taxing authority: while the purpose of po-
lice power is ensuring individual compliance, the purpose of taxing power is to
raise revenue for social programs. See 16 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 44:2 (3d ed.
2018) (distinguishing taxing powers from policing powers).
57. See City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State Analysis, supra note 41
(listing states limiting taxation and expenditures).  The states that do not limit
taxation or expenditures are Connecticut, Vermont, Delaware, Hawaii, Georgia,
New Hampshire, Virginia, and Tennessee. See id. (listing states that do not limit
taxation and expenditures).
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B. The Sterling Act: Pennsylvania Cities Get Their First Taste
of Taxing Authority
During the Great Depression, Pennsylvania faced an onslaught of eco-
nomic turmoil and political challenges.58  Budgetary deficits and rampant
unemployment jeopardized the citizens and institutions of the Common-
wealth.59  Legislators viewed the Sterling Act’s local delegation framework
as the most politically feasible solution—removing the need for a constitu-
tional amendment and avoiding the unpopularity of increased Common-
wealth sales taxes.60  The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the law
with little debate or modification, hoping to quickly grant cities the auton-
omy necessary to handle the impacts of the depression.61  In the words of
one senator, the Sterling Act would be “the salvation of Philadelphia.”62
The Sterling Act, and later the Local Tax Enabling Act, gave cities
and municipalities the authority to levy their own taxes so long as they did
not tax subjects, privileges, transactions, occupations, or personal property
already subject to Pennsylvania taxes.63  In other words, if Pennsylvania
can tax something, but does not, a city, township, or other municipality
then has the power to collect a tax on that item.64  Conversely, a local
taxing policy is an invalid exercise of power when it is duplicative of a
Commonwealth tax under the Sterling Act’s preemption doctrine.65  For
58. See The Sterling Act: A Brief History, supra note 14, at 2 (noting the economic
turmoil facing Pennsylvania influencing the decision to enact the Sterling Act).
59. See id. at 2–3 (describing economic conditions present during the Great
Depression).
60. See Moore, supra note 15, at 812–14 (describing economic and political
climate surrounding passage of Sterling Act).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
had already rejected an attempted graduated income tax, rendering a constitu-
tional amendment the only path to that solution. See id. (citing Kelly v. Kalodner,
181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935)) (explaining failure to pass graduated income tax).  Another
option, a general sales tax, would have been “political suicide,” which left only one
solution—aggregation of numerous small taxes. See id. (explaining process of
Pennsylvania’s selection of tax delegation).  Supporters of the law believed that it
would succeed in combatting poverty and unemployment where action on the
state level had previously failed. See S. 14-17, Ex. Sess., at 665 (Pa. 1932) (acknowl-
edging failure of state solutions and supporting passage of Sterling Act).
61. See generally S. 14-17, Ex. Sess. (Pa. 1932) (recording procedural steps of
enacting Sterling Act and containing unanimous approval and little debate); see
also The Sterling Act: A Brief History, supra note 58, at 2 (summarizing historical and
procedural circumstances surrounding passage of Sterling Act).
62. See S. 14-17, Ex. Sess., at 665–66 (Pa. 1932) (quoting Senator Samuel W.
Salus) (praising the Sterling Act for its projected success in combatting poverty
and unemployment).
63. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15971(a) (West 2018) (delegating
taxing authority to cities of the first class); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6924.301.1 (West 2018) (delegating taxing authority to other municipal bodies).
64. See generally 27 JOSEPH C. BRIGHT, SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D TAXATION § 14:1 (2d
ed. 2018) (summarizing Pennsylvania’s statutory delegation of taxing authority to
cities and municipalities).
65. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15971(a) (“[S]uch council shall
not have authority to levy, assess and collect, or provide for the levying, assessment
10
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example, Pennsylvania collects a tax on sales and use, which is measured
by the price of a good sold at retail and ultimately borne by consumers.66
Philadelphia is therefore preempted from imposing its own sales and use
tax measured by the price of a good sold at retail and borne by con-
sumer—in short, a consumer in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania will not be re-
sponsible for paying two different taxes on the same retail good.67
Despite this prohibition, the Sterling Act provides cities like Philadel-
phia instructions for avoiding preemption.68  The Sterling Act provisions
can be, and have been, read permissively rather than restrictively.69  The
prohibition on double taxation is an exception to the general rule of al-
lowing cities to levy taxes.70  Moreover, the taxing power afforded to cities
under the Sterling Act is granted “subject only to the foregoing provisions”
regarding tax duplication.71  Since taking effect, municipalities have in-
voked the Sterling Act to enact taxes on virtually everything from pinball
machines to roller skating rinks.72  These provisions ultimately enabled
Philadelphia to even impose the nation’s first city income tax.73
and collection of, any tax on a privilege, transaction, subject or occupation, or on
personal property, which is now or may hereafter become subject to a State tax or
license fee.”).
66. See 72 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7202 (West 2018) (imposing six
percent tax on purchase price of each sale of tangible property or service in
Pennsylvania).
67. See, e.g., United Tavern Owners v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 272 A.2d 868, 873
(Pa. 1970) (invalidating local tax on alcohol for duplicating Commonwealth sales
tax).  For further discussion on United Tavern Owners, see infra notes 95–101 and
accompanying text.
68. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15971(a) (West 2018) (permitting
cities of the first class to levy certain taxes for general revenue).
69. See, e.g., Breitinger v. City of Philadelphia, 70 A.2d 640, 645 (Pa. 1950)
(interpreting Sterling Act broadly in favor of local tax).
70. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15971(a) (West 2018) (allowing
local taxes with the exception of taxes imposed by Pennsylvania). The law reads:
[T]he council of any city of the first class shall have the authority by ordi-
nance, for general revenue purposes, to levy, assess and collect, or pro-
vide for the levying, assessment and collection of, such taxes on persons,
transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects and personal property,
within the limits of such city of the first class, as it shall determine, except
that such council shall not have authority to levy, assess and collect, or
provide for the levying, assessment and collection of, any tax on a privi-
lege, transaction, subject or occupation, or on personal property, which is
now or may hereafter become subject to a State tax or license fee.
Id.
71. See id. (“[T]his section [confers] upon cities of the first class the power to
levy, assess and collect taxes upon any and all subjects of taxation which the Com-
monwealth has power to tax but which it does not now tax or license, subject only
to the foregoing provisions . . . .”).
72. See, e.g., Coe v. Duffield, 138 A.2d 303, 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (uphold-
ing a local tax on pinball machines, drive-in theaters, and roller-skating rinks).
73. See The Sterling Act: A Brief History, supra note 58, at 3 (citation omitted)
(observing that Philadelphia was the first city in the United States to tax the in-
come of its citizens).
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C. Coke or Pepsi? Courts Face Conflicting Choices Construing the Sterling Act
Applying Sterling Act preemption doctrine proved to be easier said
than done.74  Although appearing to concur in dicta regarding the opera-
tion of the law, Pennsylvania judges and justices have routinely disagreed
on more detailed inquiries of statutory interpretation.75  Over the roughly
eighty-year lifespan of the Sterling Act, courts have quarreled over what
constitutes a duplicative “privilege, transaction, subject or occupation . . .
subject to a State tax”.76  The Sterling Act also contains no reference to
the level of deference intended for municipal policies, adding further con-
fusion over whether to err in favor of a city or taxpayer.77
1. The Debate over “Dew”-plication
To determine whether a local tax duplicated a Commonwealth tax,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia v. Samuels78 examined
the language of the city ordinance at issue.79  The plaintiffs in Samuels
argued that a city tax on gross receipts from parking revenue unlawfully
duplicated the Commonwealth stock and corporate income taxes.80  Be-
cause the word “transaction” appeared in the ordinance, the court rea-
soned that Philadelphia’s tax on parking lots was an excise tax and thus
did not duplicate Pennsylvania’s stock or corporate income taxes.81  The
court concluded this despite the tax’s practical effects, which, like the state
74. See, e.g., City & Cty. of Philadelphia v. Samuels, 12 A.2d 79, 81 (Pa. 1940)
(describing preemption doctrine as “often illogical and arbitrary”); City of Phila-
delphia v. Tax Review Bd. ex rel. Scott, 601 A.2d 875, 877 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)
(noting difficulty of “extract[ing] a comprehensive analysis” from cases interpret-
ing local tax preemption doctrine), appeal denied sub nom. Janney Montgomery
Scott Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 612 A.2d 986 (Pa. 1992); see also The Sterling Act: A
Brief History, supra note 58, at 1 (observing that “[t]he amorphous manner in which
the Sterling Act was written has provided opponents and proponents of the legisla-
tion with a great deal of interpretive and implementation flexibility over the
years”).
75. Compare Samuels, 12 A.2d at 81 (focusing on language in ordinance to de-
termine whether local tax was duplicative), with Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A.2d
280, 284 (Pa. 1950) (Murray I) (focusing on “the practical operation of the two
taxes” over “mere difference in terminology” to determine whether local tax was
duplicative).
76. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15971(a) (West 2018) (precluding local
taxes on duplicative “persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects and
personal property”).  For a complete discussion of the conflicting precedent decid-
ing whether a tax is duplicative, see infra notes 78–87 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of the court’s opposing rules of construction with respect
to the Sterling Act, see infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
78. 12 A.2d 79 (Pa. 1940).
79. See id. at 81–82 (focusing duplication analysis around “the word used in
the ordinance”).
80. See id. at 80–81 (stating issue on appeal).
81. See id. at 81–82 (finding city tax on parking lots not preempted).
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corporate net income tax, would increase taxes proportional to the park-
ing lot’s revenue.82
A decade later, in Murray v. City of Philadelphia,83 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania invalidated Philadelphia’s tax on dividends received from
corporations.84  However, that court examined the economic impact of
the tax rather than the language of the ordinance in holding the tax was
unlawfully duplicative.85  Drawing the line between distinct subjects, per-
sons, privileges, or transactions is complex enough.86  However, these is-
sues are often compounded given that most taxes involve multiple
subjects, persons, privileges, and transactions.87
2. Half-Full or Half-Empty: Should Taxpayers or Governments Benefit from
Statutory Ambiguity?
To complicate matters further, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
delivered two opinions on the same day that applied diametrically-oppos-
ing rules of construction to the Sterling Act.88  First, in Breitinger v. City of
Philadelphia,89 the court applied great deference to the city council and
presumed that Philadelphia “did not intend to levy a tax which it had no
authority to impose.”90  However, in its next decision, Murray v. City of
82. See id. (rejecting argument that city tax duplicated state tax).
83. 71 A.2d 280 (Pa. 1950) (Murray I).
84. See id. at 290 (finding tax preempted under Sterling Act).
85. See id. at 283–84 (deciding issue of duplicity by assessing practical opera-
tion of taxes over “mere difference in terminology”).  Notably, the court remarked:
In ascertaining the scope of the taxing power conferred, the court must
deal with the realities of the situation and may not be misled by ambigu-
ous words used to describe taxes in other contexts. It is often said that
taxation is a practical matter, frequently arbitrary and illogical, and that
words used to describe taxes in one context are not always used in the
same sense nor with the same meaning in another.
Id.
86. See, e.g., National Biscuit Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 98 A.2d 182, 198 n.2
(Pa. 1953) (Bell, J., concurring in part) (calling the standard for distinguishing
taxes “so nebulous, flexible and fluctuating, that the decisions on point through-
out the entire country are ofttimes vacillating, confused and contradictory”).
87. See 27 JOSEPH C. BRIGHT, SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D TAXATION § 14:5 (2d ed. 2018)
(asking how many subjects, persons, transactions, etc. must duplicate a Common-
wealth tax before a court will find preemption of a local tax under the Sterling
Act).
88. Compare Murray v. City of Philadelphia, 70 A.2d 647, 651 (Pa. 1950) (Mur-
ray II) (construing Sterling Act strictly against city in favor of tax payers), with Breit-
inger v. City of Philadelphia, 70 A.2d 640, 645 (Pa. 1950) (applying presumption of
taxing authority in favor of Philadelphia).  The presumption applied in Breitinger
appears even more misplaced considering that, earlier in the opinion, the court
noted that the city’s taxing power must be “plainly and unmistakeably [sic] con-
ferred” and “[i]n cases of doubt the construction should be against the govern-
ment.” See Breitinger, 70 A.2d at 642 (citations omitted).
89. 70 A.2d 640 (Pa. 1950).
90. See id. at 645 (applying presumption in favor of city’s taxing authority).
13
Morgan: The Coca-Cola Capitation Conundrum: The Supreme Court of Pennsylv
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
150 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: p. 137
Philadelphia,91 the court strictly construed the Sterling Act in favor of the
taxpayers in resolving the ambiguity regarding the scope of the city’s tax-
ing authority.92  Without clear standards governing judicial construction
of municipal authority, Pennsylvania courts have struggled to apply this
doctrine consistently.93  The aftermath of these cases is a jurisprudence
replete with uncertainty.94
3. The Original Beverage Case—United Tavern Owners v. Philadelphia
School District
United Tavern Owners v. Philadelphia School District95 illustrates the in-
herent uncertainty in the doctrine of intrastate preemption.96  In United
Tavern Owners, Philadelphia attempted to enact a ten percent tax on retail
sales of alcohol.97  After a lengthy discussion of the often-contradictory
case law, a plurality of justices summarily announced that the proposed tax
was preempted “because the sales of liquor are already subject to two state
taxes . . . .”98  Oddly, the plurality offered little legal justification for its
91. 70 A.2d 647 (Pa. 1950) (Murray II).
92. See id. at 651 (applying strict construction of Sterling Act).
93. Compare Middletown Twp. v. Alverno Valley Farms, 524 A.2d 1039, 1041
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (upholding business privilege tax), appeal denied, 535 A.2d
1058 (Pa. 1987), and Fish v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 128 A.3d 764, 771 (Pa. 2015)
(upholding business privilege tax), with Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Spring Garden
Twp., 699 A.2d 847, 849 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (finding preemption of business
privilege tax).
94. See 27 JOSEPH C. BRIGHT, SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D TAXATION § 14:4 (2d ed. 2018)
(noting that in Pennsylvania “there are no clear guidelines defining what will and
will not preempt a local tax”).  One commentator argues for the abolishment of
the doctrine:
As long as the doctrine continues in its present mute form, it will remain
impossible to predict with any rational assurance whether it has been vio-
lated.  Since the doctrine now presents an unascertainable standard of
conduct, it seems legitimate to suggest that is offers the antithesis of law,
and therefore should be abandoned.
See Stewart Dalzell, The State Preemption Doctrine: Lessons from the Pennsylvania Experi-
ence, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 205, 230 (1972).
95. 272 A.2d 868 (Pa. 1971).
96. See generally id. at 873–74 (providing contradictory reasoning in holding
that the challenged tax was preempted).
97. See id. at 869 (describing challenged tax imposed by Philadelphia).
98. See id. at 873 (announcing the holding of the court).  The court’s prior
articulation of the doctrine is, at times, contradictory; for example, at one point,
the plurality noted that it will rely on the “general tenor” of a statute to determine
the intent of the legislature. See id. at 870 (citation omitted) (“But if the general
tenor of the statute indicates an intention on the part of the legislature that it
should not be supplemented by municipal bodies, that intention must be given
effect and the attempted local legislation must be held invalid.”).  Later, the court
stated that it would not invalidate a local law absent express preemption. See id. at
871 (“[W]e will refrain from striking down the local ordinance unless the Com-
monwealth has explicitly claimed the authority for itself . . . .”).
14
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holding.99  The dissenters in United Tavern Owners believed the doctrine of
preemption did not even apply to taxation.100  Despite these sharply op-
posing viewpoints over the application of the Sterling Act, the statute has
remained virtually unchanged for over eighty years.101  Against this back-
drop, lawmakers, lawyers, and judges were tasked with applying state tax
preemption to Philadelphia’s tax on sugary beverages in Williams.102
III. CRACKING OPEN THE COLD FACTS OF
WILLIAMS V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
On June 16, 2016, the Philadelphia City Council (the City) passed the
“Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Tax,” imposing a tax of one and one-half
cents per fluid ounce on sugary beverages purchased by dealers from dis-
tributors.103  Under the ordinance, any nonalcoholic beverages listing
sugar or artificial sweeteners as ingredients were subject to the tax.104  The
tax applied any time a restaurant, street vendor, or other retailer pur-
chased a sugar-sweetened beverage from a supplier for the purpose of sell-
ing the drinks to consumers.105
The City’s soda tax imposition quickly became the subject of sharp
public controversy.106  Several consumers, retailers, distributors, and as-
99. See generally id. (invalidating local tax with little legal analysis on why taxa-
tion would not be appropriate).
100. See id. at 875 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (“To my knowledge there has not
heretofore existed in Pennsylvania a doctrine of preemption in the field of taxa-
tion, nor do I see any basis or need for creating one.”).
101. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15971 (West 2018) (noting only
one amendment since the passage of the Sterling Act).  The Act contained a sunset
provision which applied the taxing authority to cities of the second class for three
years. See S. 14-17, Ex. Sess., at 665–66 (Pa. 1932).  In 1961, the legislature
amended the Sterling Act solely to remove any reference to cities of the second
class. See Act of July 26, 1961, P.L. 904, § 1 (eliminating references to second-class
cities); see also Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 429 n.8 (Pa. 2018)
(observing that the Sterling Act has not changed since 1961).
102. For a discussion of the circumstances culminating in the Williams deci-
sion, see infra notes 103–13 and accompanying text.
103. See generally PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 19-4100 (codifying Philadelphia’s Sugar
Sweetened Beverage Tax); id. § 19-4103(2) (setting the tax rate on various
beverages).
104. See id. § 19-4100(3) (defining the term “sugar-sweetened beverage”).
The tax would not apply to, inter alia, baby formula, drinks made up of more than
fifty percent fruit or vegetable juice, or drinks which could have sugar added to
them at the request of the customer. See id. § 19-4100(3)(c).
105. See id. § 19-4103(1) (describing the transactions to which the tax would
apply).
106. See Neighborhood Night Hearing, COMM. OF THE WHOLE, COUNCIL OF
THE CITY OF PHILA. 17–22 (Apr. 12, 2016), http://legislation.phila.gov/trans
cripts/Public%20Hearings/whole/2016/wh0412b6.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XC
W-EG4M] (testimony of Coca-Cola employees) (arguing that soda tax would cause
hundreds of lost jobs); see also id. at 9–16 (testimony of Parks Alliance representa-
tives) (arguing in favor of soda tax for benefit of public park and recreation center
access); Working Class Neighborhoods are Paying the Price in Philadelphia, AM. BEVERAGE
ASS’N (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.ameribev.org/education-resources/blog/post/
15
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sociations filed a complaint in the Philadelphia County Court of Common
Pleas challenging Philadelphia’s authority to levy the tax under the Ster-
ling Act.107  The tax, the plaintiffs argued, unlawfully duplicated and con-
flicted with the Commonwealth’s sales and use tax on soft drinks.108
Ultimately, the plaintiffs sought a declaration from the court stating that
Pennsylvania law preempted the Philadelphia soda tax.109  In response,
Philadelphia moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.110  According to the City, the Sterling Act expressly authorized
Philadelphia to tax sugary beverages based on volume at distribution.111
The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas concluded that, as
a matter of law, the tax was not duplicative of the Commonwealth sales
tax, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.112  On appeal, the Com-
working-class-neighborhoods-are-paying-the-price-in-philadelphia/ [https://per
ma.cc/HSS3-KL6D] (criticizing Philadelphia soda tax’s adverse effects on small
business owners and working-class families); The Philly Beverage Tax Facing Major
Shortfall, AM. BEVERAGE ASS’N (June 13, 2017), https://www.ameribev.org/educa
tion-resources/blog/post/the-philly-beverage-tax-facing-major-shortfall/ [https://
perma.cc/EKL8-42DY] (criticizing Philadelphia soda tax for failing to raise pro-
jected revenue); Franklin Liu, Sin Taxes: Have Governments Gone Too Far in their
Efforts to Monetize Morality?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 763, 77–81 (2018) (criticizing Philadel-
phia soda tax and other “sin taxes”).
107. See Complaint at 7–9, Williams v. City of Philadelphia, No. 160901452,
2016 WL 7422362, at *1 (Phila. Cty. Ct. Common Pleas Dec. 19, 2016) (listing and
describing the plaintiffs).  Among the plaintiffs were the American Beverage Asso-
ciation, the Pennsylvania Beverage Association, the Philadelphia Beverage Associa-
tion, and the Pennsylvania Food Merchants Association. See id. (naming
challengers to the city’s authority to levy soda tax).  The plaintiffs further asserted
that the tax violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See
id. at 6 (alleging that the soda tax violated the Uniformity Clause).
108. See id. at 1–2 (stating the grounds of the complaint).
109. See id. at 49 (requesting declaratory relief and a permanent injunction
from the court).
110. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Preliminary Objec-
tions at 1, Williams v. City of Philadelphia, No. 160901452, 2016 WL 7422362, at *1
(Phila. Cty. Ct. Common Pleas Dec. 19, 2016) (seeking dismissal of the complaint
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).
111. See id. at 20–38 (arguing the Sterling Act did not preempt the soda tax,
but rather expressly granted Philadelphia the authority to levy the tax).
112. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, No. 1452, 2016 WL 7422362, at *3
(Phila. Cty. Ct. Common Pleas Dec. 19, 2016) (“[T]his court finds as a matter of
law that the PBT is not duplicative of the Commonwealth’s Sales and Use Tax and
is therefore not preempted.”).
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monwealth Court affirmed the dismissal.113  The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania granted review in early 2018.114
IV. THE TAXPAYERS’ CHALLENGE TO THE SODA TAX FIZZLES OUT:
A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF WILLIAMS
The principal issue on appeal at the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was whether, under the Sterling Act, the Philadelphia soda tax was unlaw-
fully duplicative of the Commonwealth sales tax.115  According to the
Court, the Sterling Act afforded “an enormously broad and sweeping
power of taxation” to Philadelphia.116  Thus, Philadelphia had the power
under the Act to tax that which “the Commonwealth has the power to
tax—but does not tax”.117
Initially, the question of duplication required the court to examine
the tax’s “incidence.”118  Incidence, in the context of taxation, refers to
“the subject matter of the tax” and “the measure of the tax.”119  Phrased
differently, the incidence of a tax falls upon the one with the ultimate
burden of paying the tax.120  The court discussed two approaches to the
incidence inquiry—economic and legal.121
First, economic incidence examines the practical economic impact of
the tax.122  In the case of the beverage tax, the consumers bore the eco-
nomic burden as retailers around the city raised prices to offset increased
113. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164 A.3d 576, 596 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2017) (affirming trial court’s order).  The court also held that the soda tax did not
violate the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at 595–96
(affirming trial court’s dismissal of Uniformity Clause counts).  Finally, the Com-
monwealth Court held that the Food Stamp Act did not preempt the soda tax. See
id. at 593–94 (affirming trial court’s dismissal of Food Stamp preemption counts).
In-depth discussions of the Uniformity Clause and Food Stamp Act preemption
issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
114. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 180 A.3d 365 (Pa. 2018) (per
curiam) (granting limited appeal).
115. See id. (stating issue on appeal).  The issue on appeal in Williams was,
“Does the City’s Tax violate the Sterling Act, 53 P.S. § 15971, which prohibits Phila-
delphia from imposing a tax on a transaction or subject that the Commonwealth
already taxes?” See id.
116. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 429 (Pa. 2018) (inter-
nal quotations omitted) (citation omitted) (describing Philadelphia’s taxing au-
thority under Sterling Act).
117. See id. at 429–30 (explaining preemption doctrine).
118. See id. at 431 (articulating standard for determining whether local tax
duplicates Commonwealth tax).
119. See id. at 425 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted) (defining
incidence as it relates to tax duplication under the Sterling Act).
120. See generally Ian Clark, Burden of a Tax - Economic vs. Legal Incidence, ATLAS
OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, http://www.atlas101.ca/pm/concepts/burden-of-a-tax-
economic-vs-legal-incidence/ [https://perma.cc/PZ3B-NBTJ] (last visited Sep. 2,
2018) (distinguishing between legal and economic incidence).
121. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 431 (discussing legal and economic incidence).
122. See Clark, supra note 119 (defining economic incidence as “who bears
the burden” of tax liability).
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supplier costs.123  Thus, the city soda tax had the same economic inci-
dence as the Commonwealth sales and use tax because both taxes resulted
in the increase of consumer prices.124
In contrast, legal incidence focuses on the persons intended by the
legislature to bear the tax—the party responsible for submitting payment
to the government.125  The advantage of using legal incidence over eco-
nomic incidence, the court noted, was that legal incidence is prophylactic
in nature, and therefore easier to apply.126  The legal incidence test also
appeared to be more consistent with Pennsylvania precedent.127  Moreo-
ver, utilizing the economic incidence test seemed contrary to the appar-
ently broad delegation of taxing authority in the Sterling Act.128
Accordingly, the court compared the legal incidence of the Philadelphia
soda tax and the Commonwealth sales and use tax to determine whether
the former duplicated the latter—excluding economic incidence from its
analysis.129
Applying the legal incidence test, three distinctions protected the
soda tax from preemption: “subjects, measures, and payers.”130  The “sub-
ject” of the Commonwealth sales tax was retailer-consumer transactions,
while that of the Philadelphia soda tax was supplier-retailer transac-
tions.131  Moreover, unlike the state sales tax, which measured the tax
123. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 426–27 (noting that economic burdens of tax
fell upon consumers purchasing sugary beverages).
124. See Brief for Appellants at 20–21, Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164
A.3d 576 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (arguing that soda tax unlawfully duplicated
Commonwealth sales tax due to identical economic incidences).
125. See Clark, supra note 120 (defining legal incidence as “who writes the
cheque to the government”).  Stated differently, the legal incidence falls on the
persons “hit” by the tax, and the economic incidence falls on the persons “hurt” by
the tax. See Jacqueline M. Moen, Federal Immunity and the Arizona Transaction Privi-
lege Tax on Prime Contracting: Is Arizona’s Tax Unconstitutional?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 615,
617 n.18 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxa-
tion, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89
HARV. L. REV. 682, 706 n.104 (1976)) (distinguishing between legal and economic
incidence).
126. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 432 (internal quotations omitted) (internal cita-
tion omitted) (describing legal incidence test as a “reasonably bright line
standard”).
127. See id. at 431 (citing Commonwealth v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 136 A.2d 821
(Pa. 1957)) (summarizing past decisions where the court applied the legal inci-
dence over the economic incidence).
128. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 431 (concluding that legislature did not intend
to limit local taxing authority absent express provision to the contrary).
129. See id. at 433 (stating legal incidence determines whether local taxes are
duplicative and using that standard in this case’s comparison).
130. See id. at 434–35 (holding soda tax had distinct legal incidence from
Commonwealth sales tax).
131. See id. at 433–35 (describing differences between subjects of soda tax and
sales tax).
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based on price, the City’s tax liability was based on volume.132  Finally, the
respective tax burdens fell on different payer classifications—retailers
bore the price of the soda tax, while consumers carried the burden of
paying the sales tax.133  As a result, the court found that Philadelphia’s
soda tax could not be a duplicate of the Commonwealth sales tax.134
While the court in Williams unanimously agreed that the legal inci-
dence test applied, the dissenters argued that the majority nonetheless
should have weighed the soda tax’s economic realities.135  The dissent
pointed to statements from the mayor and city council members arguing
that the tax was specifically intended to discourage consumers.136  Specifi-
cally, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s failure  to justify its stance
that economic realities are wholly irrelevant.137  The dissent looked to the
practical effects of the tax and reasoned that the soda tax was imposed on
beverages, not distributors.138  The dissent accordingly disagreed with the
majority’s broad construction of the Sterling Act.139
132. See id. (describing differences between measures of soda tax and sales
tax).
133. See id. (describing differences between payers of soda tax and sales tax).
134. See id. at 435 (finding sufficient legal incidence distinctions between soda
and sales tax to avoid preemption).
135. See id. at 446 (Mundy, J., dissenting) (agreeing with doctrinal framework
articulated by majority); id. at 444–46 n.14 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (agreeing that
legal-incidence test applied, but rejecting categorical exclusion of economic im-
pact of tax for purpose of determining whether local tax is duplicative).
136. See id. at 440 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (citing Interview by Michael Smer-
conish with Jim Kenney, Mayor, Philadelphia (Apr. 7, 2016)) (noting statements
from mayor implying that aim of soda tax is to influence consumer behavior).
137. See id. at 441 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (emphasizing majority’s failure to
reconcile incohesive precedent).  Justice Wecht specifically criticized the majority’s
overly-literal approach, writing:
I do not find the Majority’s effort to find the safe harbor of clarity in the
bright-line of the “legal incidence” test reconcilable with a test requiring
the assessment of a tax’s practical effect.  Indeed, speaking generally, I find
irreconcilable the very notions of a practical inquiry and a bright-line test,
and I discern no substantive benefit in this context to abandoning our
long-standing if messier approach to such questions.  For this reason, I
find it incongruous to imply, as the Majority does, that we cannot seek a
given levy’s “legal incidence” by looking beyond nomenclature to focus
upon its foreseen, and even intended, effects—regardless of whether that
entails some consideration of economic effects.
See id. at 444–45 (Wecht, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 446–47 (Mundy, J., dissenting) (arguing that subject of tax is
beverages).
139. See id. at 444–45 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s broad
interpretation of local taxing authority granted under the Sterling Act); id. at 447
(Mundy, J., dissenting) (concluding that true subject of beverage tax was retail
sales).
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V. A THIRST FOR PREDICTABILITY QUENCHED ONLY BY LEGISLATION:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WILLIAMS
Notwithstanding whether the soda tax itself is an advantageous policy,
Williams is a win for municipalities around Pennsylvania, which may now
be empowered to levy taxes on virtually anything absent future legislative
constraint.140  The dismissal of the complaint in Williams at the pleadings
stage may have been premature, especially considering the disharmony of
the court’s precedent.141  Despite the court’s effort to create a workable
framework in Williams, the decision does not appear to provide any clear
guidance towards rectifying past discrepancies.142  The court in Williams
applied the legal incidence test mainly out of necessity, as the Sterling Act
itself offers no guidance regarding its interpretation.143  However, neither
the legal incidence test nor the economic incidence test adequately bal-
140. See Nat’l Biscuit Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 98 A.2d 182, 184 (Pa. 1953)
(“It has become a mere platitude to state, what has so often been proclaimed, that
courts are concerned, not with the wisdom of legislation, but with the right of the
legislative body to enact it, -not with policy but with power.”); see also Williams, 188
A.3d at 436 (deferring responsibility for reigning in unintended consequences of
decision to Pennsylvania legislature); Brief for Appellants at 14, Williams v. City of
Philadelphia, 188 A.3d  421 (Pa. 2018) (Nos. 2 & 3 EAP 2018) (arguing that up-
holding soda tax signals judicial approval of unlimited local taxing power).  One
amicus opposing the tax listed examples of taxes which would be permissible if the
court found for Philadelphia:
Lancaster may decide to discourage automobile ownership by imposing a
tax on the delivery of automobiles to retail automotive dealerships within
city limits; Scranton may decide to impose a similar tax on the delivery of
bicycles for sale at retail; Altoona may opt for a tax on periodicals deliv-
ered to newsstands for retail sale . . . .
Amici Curiae Brief of the National Federation of Independent Business Small Busi-
ness at 21–22, Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164 A.3d 575 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2017) (Nos. 2077 & 2078 C.D. 2016).  Moreover, Philadelphia’s success in defend-
ing the ordinance may influence the approach other localities in Pennsylvania and
around the United States take in implementing tax policies. See 1 MATTHEWS MU-
NICIPAL ORDINANCES, supra note 8, § 1:4 (noting that “new legal trends” may affect
how municipalities may enact policy).
141. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164 A.3d 576, 600–01 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2017) (Covey, J., dissenting) (arguing for reversal because matter was issue of
first impression), aff’d, 188 A.3d 421 (Pa. 2018).  To win a motion to dismiss, or
“demurrer,” in Pennsylvania, the movant is entitled to relief only if it is “clear and
free from doubt” that the complaint is legally insufficient. See C.G. v. J.H., 172
A.3d 43, 55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (internal citation omitted) (stating legal standard
for demurrer), appeal granted on other grounds, 179 A.3d 440 (Pa. 2018).  On appel-
late review, the demurrer will only be affirmed if “the law says with certainty that
no recovery is possible.” See Cooper v. Church of St. Benedict, 954 A.2d 1216, 1219
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (reciting standard of appellate review applied to demurrers);
see also PA. R. CIV. P. 1028(a)(4) (2016) (listing demurrer as potential ground for
preliminary objections to pleadings).
142. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 433 n.14 (Pa. 2018) (stating intent for legal
incidence test to provide clarity to incohesive precedent); id. at 441 (Wecht, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to harmonize conflicting case law).
143. See id. at 430–32 (finding that legal incidence analysis applied based on
intent and context of Sterling Act).
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ances the competing interests at play in the tax preemption doctrine.144
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania General Assembly should determine its in-
tended mode of interpretation and amend the Sterling Act accordingly.145
A. Watered Down: The Sterling Act’s Lack of Specificity Creates Issues
with Statutory Interpretation
The Sterling Act’s silence on its own construction is perhaps the prin-
cipal source of the preemption doctrine’s inconsistencies.146  When a stat-
ute governs the disposition of a dispute, courts ordinarily must follow the
statute’s express language.147  If the text of the statute is ambiguous,
courts attempt to resolve this doubt by examining the intent of the legisla-
ture.148  If, after this inquiry, the meaning of a statute remains unclear,
only then may a court substitute its own judgment in light of policy, equity,
or other considerations.149
The Sterling Act does not define “privilege,” “transaction,” “subject,”
or “occupation.”150  The Sterling Act further fails to specify whether to
construe the statute in favor of cities or taxpayers.151  These key omissions
have forced Pennsylvania courts to create a framework of interpretation
where one otherwise does not exist.152 Williams’ legal incidence approach
is simply the most recent manifestation of this struggle.153  Although con-
ceding the possibility of “unintended consequences,” the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania refused to amend the Sterling Act from the bench.154
144. For a further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the legal
incidence test, see infra notes 156–70 and accompanying text.  For a further discus-
sion of the advantages and disadvantages of the economic incidence test, see infra
notes 171–78 and accompanying text.
145. For a complete argument in favor of legislation clarifying the scope of
local taxing authority under the Sterling Act, see infra notes 179–90 and accompa-
nying text.
146. See, e.g., Williams, 188 A.3d at 432 (relying on omissions from text of Ster-
ling Act as partial justification of utilizing the legal incidence test rather than the
economic incidence test).
147. See McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 686 A.2d 801, 805 (Pa. 1996)
(describing concept of statutory construction and interpretation).
148. See id. (outlining procedure for interpretation of ambiguous statutory
provisions).
149. See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 58–98 (2018) (describing various
considerations which aid in statutory construction and interpretation).
150. See generally 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15971 (West 2018) (us-
ing terms “privilege, transaction, subject or occupation” without accompanying
definition).
151. See generally id. (neglecting to provide deference to taxpayers or
municipalities).
152. See, e.g., supra notes 74–101 and accompanying text (discussing conflict
in the interpretation of the Sterling Act).
153. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 433 (Pa. 2018) (inter-
preting the Sterling Act to prohibit local taxes with duplicative legal incidence of
state tax).
154. See id. at 436 (declining to adopt taxpayers’ interpretation despite policy
concerns with legal incidence test).  These “unintended consequences” included
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Rather, the court declared that it would await legislative clarification
before altering its approach.155  Thus, so long as the Sterling Act remains
silent on key issues of interpretation, the doctrine of local tax preemption
will likely remain inconsistent.156
B. The Legal Incidence Test: Opening the Floodgates to Local Taxes
The legal incidence test applied by the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania is narrow almost to the point of nullifying state preemption.157
Avoiding preemption under this literal interpretation may now be a mat-
ter of word choice rather than any meaningful distinction.158  If a city can
avoid preemption with clever ordinance drafting, the rules governing pre-
emption are rendered meaningless.159  The result of this “lawyer’s game”
could continue to create a plethora of administrative and litigative waste-
fulness.160  Even ardent advocates of increased local autonomy acknowl-
opening the door to unlimited city taxing authority, according to the taxpayers.
See id. (citation omitted) (responding to policy concerns of petitioners).  For a
further discussion of the potential consequences of the legal incidence framework,
see infra notes 156–70 and accompanying text.
155. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 436 (finding statutory language to be “clear
enough” so that any subsequent modification would require legislative
intervention).
156. See id. (deferring to the legislature, in part, because of the legislature’s
“superior resources . . . in assessing matters of social policy”).  In relevant part, the
majority stated:
The concern that unintended consequences may unfold are prevalent
relative to the promulgation of experimental, remedial legislation such as
the Sterling Act.  Where the language of the governing statute is clear (or
clear enough), however, the solution is legislative—and not judicial—ad-
justment. In this regard, this Court regularly alludes to the superior re-
sources available to the General Assembly in assessing matters of social
policy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
157. See James Edward Maule, What’s Next? A Tax on Exiting the Store? How Un-
wise Taxes Undermine Tax Policy, MAULEDAGAIN (July 23, 2018), http://mauledagain
.blogspot.com/2018/07/#4198292661757349926 [https://perma.cc/945B-XGE6]
(criticizing Williams as too technical and narrow).
158. See Nat’l Biscuit Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 98 A.2d 182, 198 (Pa. 1953)
(Bell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority ap-
proach to preemption in favor of a practical effect test).
159. See 27 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D Taxation, supra note 14, § 14.5 (2018) (“It is a
waste of governmental and private time to lay down rules which can be evaded by
clever drafting and which, in any event, have no practical meaning.”).
160. See id. (criticizing preemption doctrine as a “lawyer’s game” resulting in
both wasteful litigation and administrative nightmares).  Costly litigation results
primarily from the uncertainty in the jurisprudence of preemption. See id. (ex-
plaining why Pennsylvania’s preemption law encourages wasteful litigation).
When the hundreds of municipalities, boroughs, cities, towns, counties, and dis-
tricts each levy discrete taxes, the result is “pointless complexity.” See id. (describ-
ing the “administrative wastefulness” resulting from the Sterling Act).
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edge that erratic applications of the law erode the confidence necessary to
develop businesses.161
To further complicate this issue, an overly-literal interpretation of the
Sterling Act may make avoiding tax liability as easy as evading tax preemp-
tion.162  Given the relatively cramped jurisdiction of the entity levying the
tax, circumventing some taxes can be achieved by simply completing the
desired transaction in a neighboring municipality.163  Since the passage of
the Philadelphia Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Tax, one study found that
while soda sales in Philadelphia fell by 55%, purchases increased by 38%
outside the city limits.164  Certainly, this loophole frustrates the public
health and revenue generation objectives of taxes like the soda tax.165
Broadening local taxing authority may also risk subjecting a vulnera-
ble minority of city residents to the tyranny of the majority.166  With the
161. See Dupuis, supra note 37, at 24 (acknowledging positive effects of pre-
emption legislation on business development).
162. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 439 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht,
J., dissenting) (questioning application of soda tax to extraterritorial transactions).
One critic points out that the ordinance contains explicit instructions for avoiding
the tax. See James Edward Maule, How Unsweet a Tax, MAULEDAGAIN (June 24,
2016), http://mauledagain.blogspot.com/2016/06/#8172255688598900675
[https://perma.cc/LS7W-SKM2] (noting that soda tax contains a “road-map for
evasion”).  Under the provisions of the soda tax, a beverage could theoretically be
sold to retailers in unsweetened form, then subsequently sweetened with added
sugars on-site. See id. (describing theoretical loophole in soda tax).
163. See Christian Britschgi, Philly Tax Spurs Black Market Soda Smuggling, REA-
SON (Mar. 16, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://reason.com/blog/2018/03/16/phillys-bev
erage-tax-spurs-black-market [https://perma.cc/M4U6-WAHU] (internal citation
omitted) (noting that consumers are purchasing soda in neighboring counties and
smuggling it into Philadelphia to avoid paying taxes).
164. See id. (internal citation omitted) (describing trends in soda sales since
the passage of Philadelphia’s soda tax).
165. See Neighborhood Night Hearing, COMM. OF THE WHOLE, COUNCIL OF
THE CITY OF PHILA. 23–26 (Apr. 12, 2016), http://legislation.phila.gov/trans
cripts/Public%20Hearings/whole/2016/wh0412b6.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WH
T-MXH6] (testimony of Dr. Barbara Gold) (discussing public health concerns to
be addressed by soda tax).
166. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (advocating for a republi-
can form of government as a means to control the effects of factions, which have
threatened the stability of past pure democracies).  Madison argued that a pure
democracy is susceptible to emotionally-driven actions, which risk harming the
rights of other citizens:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy,
by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who
assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure
for the mischiefs of faction.  A common passion or interest will, in almost
every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and con-
cert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious in-
dividual.  Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with per-
sonal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short
in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.
See id.
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power to impose additional taxes, a local government may yield to a major-
ity that will face little or no consequences from the new law at the expense
of a tiny minority.167  Many restrictions on municipal financial powers are
also aimed at preventing local governments from spending themselves
into bankruptcy.168  Defining stricter boundaries of municipal fiscal au-
thority protects the government and its constituents against creditors.169
The resulting constraint could force local authorities to reign in excessive
spending and preserve their creditworthiness.170  Given that limiting local
taxation aims to prevent the abuse of power, this concern should be at the
forefront of any legislative cure.171
C. The Economic Incidence Test Could Leave Cities Parched for Power
On the other hand, an overly-broad interpretation of state preemp-
tion doctrine vis-a`-vis the economic incidence test would tremendously
hinder a municipality’s financial self-sufficiency.172  The court in Williams
correctly noted that basing the duplicity analysis on economic incidence
would invalidate virtually all local taxes.173  Weighing the economic conse-
quences of a tax results in more cases of preemption because the burden
will almost always fall on consumers.174  An increase in state authority in
this manner may result in totally eclipsing local authority.175
167. See Vaubel, supra note 53, at 464–65 (observing that limitations on local
taxing authority are intended to protect citizens from themselves and their local
governments).
168. See, e.g., JOHN E. GOTHERMAN et al., OH. MUN. L. § 3:8 (2018) (noting
limits on Ohio cities’ fiscal authorities, in part, to reduce risk of over-borrowing).
169. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 527 (2018) (explaining
rationale for constraining local authority over financial affairs).  Incurring too
much debt could risk a situation where a local government’s creditors force the
government to either liquidate its assets or raise taxes to repay the loan. See id.
(describing scenario risked by excessive municipal debt).
170. See, e.g., Taxpayers for Improving Pub. Safety v. Schwarzenegger, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 370, 377–78 (Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that constraints on fiscal au-
thority are intended to reduce deficit spending and preserve credit of
government).
171. Cf. OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 6 (restricting cities’ taxation powers “so as to
prevent the abuse of such power.”); see also Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 1113, 1132–33 (2007) (recognizing criticism that limiting local authority
helps reduce the use of power for selfish and nefarious purposes).
172. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 442–43 (Pa. 2018)
(Wecht, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (conceding that broad interpre-
tation of preemption doctrine would render virtually all taxes duplicative). But see
id. at 443 (noting that narrow interpretation “eliminate[s] any practical likelihood
that any tax will be deemed duplicative of another, provided they differ in any
trivial detail”).
173. See id. at 432–33 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (noting issues with broad eco-
nomic incidence test).
174. See Dalzell, supra note 94, at 226 (rejecting economic incidence test to
determine duplicity of taxation because “the consumer ultimately bears all taxes”).
175. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 433–34 (1819) (summarizing
argument that federal supremacy may eventually destroy state governments).  The
24
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The overshadowing of municipal authority through the broadening
of state powers is problematic considering the very purpose of local gov-
ernment—to more efficiently serve the needs of the community.176  Cities
have historically been at the forefront of social change and innovation,
thanks to broad discretion and authority from state legislatures.177  After
all, cities are no less democratic “laboratories” than the states.178  As such,
preserving this local autonomy should be prioritized by any reconciliation
of the taxing preemption doctrine.179
argument that federal supremacy may eventually overshadow state sovereignty was
first addressed in the Federalist Papers:
As the laws of the Union are to become the supreme law of the land; as it
is to have power to pass all laws that may be necessary for carrying into
execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it; the national
government might, at any time, abolish the taxes imposed for state ob-
jects, upon the pretence [sic] of an interference with its own.  It might
allege a necessity for doing this, in order to give efficacy to the national
revenues; and thus, all the resources of taxation might, by degrees, be-
come the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and de-
struction of the state governments.
See id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton)). But cf. THE FEDER-
ALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that “[t]he moment we launch into
conjectures about the usurpations of the federal government, we get into an un-
fathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning”).
176. See 1 MCQUILLIN: THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS supra note 52,
§ 2:11 (noting that managing, regulating, and advancing community affairs is
“chief purpose” of establishing municipalities); United States v. City of New Orle-
ans, 98 U.S. 381, 393 (1878) (“A municipality without the power of taxation would
be a body without life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose.”).
177. See Diller, supra note 170, at 1117–19 (citations omitted) (commending
cities for developing policies that have been models for state or federal laws).
Among these accomplishments are policies affecting workers’ rights, affordable
housing, gay rights, and smoking prevention. See id. (listing policy initiatives
originating as city policies).
178. See id. at 1114 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (describing cities as “laboratories” of democracy,
alluding to Justice Brandeis’ similar description of states).
179. See 1 MATTHEWS MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES, supra note 8, §§ 1:1–1:4 (noting
advantages to local government solutions).  Specifically, local leaders are usually
more accessible to the populace and familiar with issues of local significance. See
id. § 1:2 (listing local access as an advantage of local government).  One commen-
tator summarizes the advantages of local government as follows:
The importance of local government can be easily seen if we look at the
effect it has on our daily lives.  We all use streets, water, garbage disposal,
and parks, which are provided by local government. Our children are
educated in schools operated by a local school board.  Our protection
from crime comes principally from local government and our fire protec-
tion and ambulance services are local.  Local government has also be-
come our line of first defense in meeting homeland security challenges,
and local law enforcement and local government leaders are crucial in
meeting these goals.  Zoning and planning regulations affect our quality
of life as well as the value of our homes.  Fire and building safety are
protected by local ordinances.  Last, but not least, noise pollution control
is also a local government responsibility.
See id. § 1.1 (footnote omitted).
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D. Amending the Sterling Act: A Refreshing Solution
Moving forward, the legislature should clarify the standard of judicial
construction for the Sterling Act and to what extent economic incidence
of a tax should be considered—if at all—for determining duplicity.180
The Pennsylvania General Assembly could take an approach similar to its
1977 enactment capping nonresident income taxes.181  By expressly im-
posing limitations or providing latitude, the legislature could establish fur-
ther clarity, certainty, and consistency for future courts interpreting the
Sterling Act.182  For example, Iowa’s home rule constitutional provision
delegates authority to municipalities which is “not inconsistent” with state
law.183  Later, the Iowa state legislature clarified that, to meet the vague
“not inconsistent” test, a city law must be “irreconcilable with the state
law.”184  The Iowa Supreme Court immediately responded, applying
greater leniency to policies enacted by local municipalities.185  Similarly,
the Illinois Constitution handles preemption ambiguity issues by requiring
express legislation providing that a certain power is exclusively reserved
for the state.186
The Williams decision shows that certainty in the area of local tax pre-
emption will require legislative intervention.187  If the Pennsylvania legisla-
180. See Bluestein, supra note 47, at 2026–27 (proposing legislative solutions
where home rule statute’s scope and standard of review are inconsistently applied
by courts).
181. See 72 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7359(b)(1) (West 2018) (limit-
ing tax rate of nonresidents under the Sterling Act to a maximum of four and five-
sixteenths percent).
182. See Vaubel, supra note 53, at 449 (noting that “the overall magnitude of
conflict . . . depends not upon constitutional provisions, but upon the clarity with
which the legislature expresses itself.” (footnote omitted)).
183. See IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 38A (“Municipal corporations are granted
home rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the general as-
sembly . . . .”).
184. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 364.2(3) (West 2018) (“An exercise of a city power
is not inconsistent with a state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law.”).
185. See Green v. City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1975) (citation
omitted) (acknowledging that “irreconcilable” was a higher standard than “incon-
sistent” in upholding local law).
186. See ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6 (upholding home rule authority of home rule
units unless expressly preempted by legislation).
187. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 436 (Pa. 2018) (defer-
ring to the General Assembly’s “superior resources” in declining to deviate from
precedent to serve policy objectives).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further
stated that any consideration of economic incidence would require legislative
authorization:
We discern no evidence from the text of the Sterling Act suggesting that
Pennsylvania courts are to embark upon such an inquiry into economic
incidence for purposes of evaluating the permissibility of local taxes.  In-
deed, had the Legislature wished for the courts to eschew the “reasonably
bright-line standard” of a legal-incidence litmus . . . it would have been a
simple matter for the Assembly to have so provided.
See id. at 432 (citations omitted).
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ture intends the Sterling Act to apply either restrictively or liberally, then it
should amend the Act or the Constitution to reflect this intent.188  By clar-
ifying the aim of the powers vested under the Sterling Act and articulating
the level of Commonwealth oversight, the General Assembly can properly
tailor local taxing authority to balance autonomy, certainty, and liberty.189
The legislature can also properly investigate which level of application or
construction will best balance the independence of municipalities with the
prosperity of its businesses and its citizens.190  Whichever approach is ulti-
mately selected, the resulting certainty will help reduce wasteful adminis-
tration and legal challenges.191
VI. WILL PENNSYLVANIA CONTINUE TO “TASTE THE FEELING” OF DOUBLE
TAXATION? THE IMPACT OF WILLIAMS’ LACK OF CLARITY
The uncertainty perpetuated by the Williams decision will likely pro-
long the precarious landscape of local tax preemption in Pennsylvania.192
Unless, and until, the Pennsylvania legislature intervenes, municipalities
around the Commonwealth will be free to draft similar taxing schemes
while businesses and citizens look for alternatives to judicial interven-
tion.193  Pennsylvania lobbyists may follow the cue of their colleagues in
other states who have refocused their efforts to avoid tax increases in vari-
188. See Bluestein, supra note 47, at 2026–27 (advocating for legislative clarity
regarding scope and applicability of statutory construction); cf. S.C. CONST. art.
VIII, § 17 (“The provisions of this Constitution and all laws concerning local gov-
ernment shall be liberally construed in their favor.”).
189. See Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV.
51, 54–55 (1989) (citing Gordon Clark, A Theory of Local Autonomy, 74(2) ANNALS
ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 195–208 (1984)) (summarizing four archetypes levels of
local autonomy).  According to Clark, there are two fundamental principles of au-
tonomy: (1) initiative and (2) immunity. See id. (defining concept of “local auton-
omy.”).  There are four permutations of initiative and immunity which range in
overall autonomy from “the autonomous city-state” on one end to “local govern-
ment under Dillon’s rule” on the other:
Type 1: initiative and immunity
Type 2: initiative and no immunity
Type 3: no initiative and immunity
Type 4: no initiative and no immunity.
See id.
190. See Richardson, supra note 38, at 14–16 (comparing advantages and dis-
advantages of liberal and restrictive standards of review).
191. See id. (listing increased certainty and reduced litigation as advantages
for both liberal and restrictive standard of review).  Based on a difference in search
volume for cases using the phrase “Dillon Rule” and cases using the phrase “home
rule,” the Brookings Institution concludes that Dillon’s Rule results in fewer legal
challenges. See id. (comparing Westlaw search volume for “Dillon Rule” and
“home rule,” but noting errors in methodology).
192. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 441 n.11 (Pa. 2018)
(Wecht, J., dissenting) (observing that “the text of the Sterling Act is anything but
a model of clarity”).
193. See Brief for Appellants at 24, Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164 A.3d
576 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (arguing that upholding tax creates roadmap for evad-
ing preemption).
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ous industries by specifically seeking the passage of express preemption
statutes.194  Municipalities will respond by attempting to enact the desired
tax before private interest groups can succeed in these endeavors.195  One
commentator argues that, as more municipalities seize their newly-recog-
nized authority, state legislative bodies will be less likely to thwart these
efforts with new preemption laws.196  Whoever wins this race to the top,
one thing is clear: individuals, business owners, and local governments in
Pennsylvania will continue to suffer the consequences until the legislature
brings certainty to this area of law.197
194. See David A. Dana et al., Soda Taxes as a Legal and Social Movement, 13 NW.
J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 84, 96 (2018) (describing food industry’s efforts to lobby states
for preemptive legislation).  Ten states—Kansas, Utah, Ohio, Wisconsin, Missis-
sippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, and North Carolina—have adopted
legislation proposed by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) which
preempts local governments from regulating certain food service operations. See
id. (listing states adopting ALEC legislation in whole or in part).
195. See id. at 103–04 (postulating that municipalities will seek to evade pre-
emption efforts by state government by passing desired taxing policies before the
state passes preemption legislation).
196. See id. (observing that states are less likely to enact preemptive legislation
if municipalities pass desired legislation first).
197. See id. at 101 (noting that continuing uncertainty “may disrupt the basic
allocation of authority between the State and localities upon which a range of pub-
lic and private actors have relied”).
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